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Abstract
This paper studies the interplay between public and private
health care in a National Health Service. We consider a two-stage
game, where at stage one a Health Authority sets the public sec-
tor wage and a subsidy to (or tax on) private provision. At stage
two the physicians decide how much to work in the public and the
private sector. We characterise di¤erent equilibria depending on
whether physicians coordinate labour supply or not, the physi-
cians’ job preferences, and the cost e¢ciency of private relative to
public provision. We …nd that private provision tends to crowd
out the NHS if physicians are su¢ciently indi¤erent about where
to work or the private sector is su¢ciently cost e¢cient. Com-
petition between physicians triggers a shift from public provision
towards private provision, and an increase in the total amount of
health care provided. The endogenous nature of labour supply
may have counter-intuitive e¤ects. For example, a cost reduction
in the private sector is followed by a higher wage in the public
sector.
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1 Introduction
Most health care systems involve a mixture of public and private pro-
vision. However, the role for private health care is di¤erent and more
limited in health care systems characterised as a National Health Service
(NHS) compared with private and mixed health care systems (see e.g.
Besley and Gouveia, 1994). In a NHS, health care is mainly provided
publicly and …nanced by general taxation. Still in most NHS systems
there exists a parallell (and growing) private sector alongside the public
one.1 An important di¤erence, though, is that patients receive public
health care for free (or at a low cost), while they typically are charged
the full cost of the medical treatment when seeking private health care.
In NHS systems that allow for private health care, physicians have
the opportunity to work in the private sector. Interestingly, we typically
observe that a substantial share of the physicians spend time in both
sectors. For instance, in the UK most private medical services are pro-
vided by physicians whose main commitment is to the NHS. The UK
Monopolies and Merger Commission (1994) estimated that about 61% of
the NHS consultants had signi…cant private work. Similar observations
can be made in other countries with a NHS, like in France, Spain, and
the Scandinavian countries (see Johnson, 1995, for an overview).
With a few notable exceptions, there are no studies that examine
the interaction between public and private health care.2 The purpose of
this paper is to help …ll this gap. We analyse the interaction between
the public and the private sector in a NHS, emphasising the direct links
between the two sectors both on the demand side and the supply side.3
1 In the UK, for instance, Propper (2000) reports that private health care expen-
ditures have increased from 9% of total health care expenditures in 1979 to 15%
in 1995. See e.g. Besley and Gouveia (1994) for an overview of public and private
health care in di¤erent countries.
2Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2002) analyse the rivalry between preferred
providers and out-of-plan providers under di¤erent reimbursement rules. Jofre-Bonet
(2000) deals with the interaction between public and private providers when con-
sumers di¤er in their income levels. Marchand and Schroyen (2001) analyse design
of contracts to NHS doctors that induce an optimal mixture of public and private
health care when the government takes distributional aspects into account.
3Rickman and McGuire (1999), (R&M) building on the model of Ellis and
McGuire (1986), is closely related to our study. However, their approach is di¤erent
from ours in many respects. First, we let a physician’s utility be determined by total
wage income in the public sector and the pro…ts attained in the private sector. In
contrast, in R&M a physician’s utility from public sector work is determined by the
performance of the public hospital as well as the satisfaction of her patients. Second,
we assume an increasing marginal disutility of work. The reason for this is that each
physician may face a soft time constraint, …nding it more and more costly to supply
an extra hour of labour. In contrast, R&M assume a constant marginal disutility.
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The analysis will focus on the following questions: How does the option
for NHS physicians to provide private health care a¤ect the public pro-
vision? Does competition between physicians imply a larger or smaller
scope for private health care? What role do job preferences and private
sector costs play for the scope for public and private provision? How
should the Health Authority set wages in the public sector, and should
it tax or subsidise the private sector?
To analyse these questions, we consider a health care system charac-
terised as a NHS. In this system there is a Health Authority (e.g. the
Ministry of Health) responsible for providing health care to individuals
in need for medical treatment. Public health care is free at the point of
consumption, while patients are charged a (full cost) price if they visit a
private clinic. The Health Authority’s task is to implement the optimal
mixture of public and private provision of health care. In this regard,
it has two instruments; the public sector wage and a subsidy to (or tax
on) private health care provision.4
The physicians’ labour supply is important for the amount of public
and private health care that will be provided. In the public sector physi-
cians are on salary, while in the private sector they are self-employed
and earn pro…ts from their private practice. This means that the public
sector wage as well as any private sector subsidies or taxes, a¤ect their
decision of how much to work in either sector. In addition, we …nd it rea-
sonable that that physicians’ job preferences play a role in determining
their time spent in the two sectors. We assume that working in a public
hospital and at a private clinic are imperfect substitutes from the physi-
cians’ perspective. As pointed out by Scott (2001), non-pecuniary job
characteristics can be highly relevant in explaining the time physicians
spend in the public and the private sector, as well as their preferences
in this respect.5
In their setting, therefore, there are no direct links on the cost side between the
two sectors. Third, we let the Health Authority act as a monopsonist in the labour
market in the public sector, and the hospital then receives full-cost reimbursement.
Although R&M have full-cost reimbursement in the public sector, they have no direct
link between the costs associated with public health care and the physicians’ revenue
from such an activity. Finally, we assume strategic interaction between physicians,
while R&M ignores the role of competition.
4We also observe that Health Authorities sometimes impose restrictions on the
private earnings of the publicly employed physicians. In the UK, for instance, full-
time NHS consultants are not allowed to earn more than 10% of their NHS salary on
their private practice. This issue is analysed in detail by Gonzáles (2002).
5 In the public sector physicians often have the opportunity for research and to
specialise. Meeting colleagues and having access to medical facilities may also be
important job characteristics for the public sector. In the private sector, on the
other hand, important non-pecuniary job characteristics may be more autonomy or
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On the demand side, we assume that public and private health care
are homogeneous products with identical quality. Although this is not
crucial for the analysis, the fact that it is the same physicians that
provide health care in both sectors is an argument in favor of this as-
sumption. Despite public and private health care being homogeneous
products, patients prefer to be taken care of in the public sector because
this means that they do not have to pay any out-of-pocket payments
for the medical treatment. However, free public health care implies that
some rationing takes place. Consequently, patients not served by the
public sector have two options. They may either visit a private clinic or
wait for public treatment.6
Allowing NHS physicians to establish private facilities outside the
NHS system may have several potential e¤ects on the provision of pub-
lic health care. In this paper, we focus on one particular e¤ect, which
is the following: By restricting their labour supply in the public sector,
physicians are able to increase the demand for private health care, and
this may in turn increase the pro…tability of spending time in the pri-
vate sector. This points to a potential instability in the NHS system
in that the private sector tends to crowd out the public provision.7 We
therefore investigate in detail how the endogenous nature of physicians’
labour supply a¤ects the Health Authority’s wage setting and support
to (or taxation of) the private sector. As it is an open question whether
the physicians coordinate their labour supply or not, we contrast a com-
petition case with a coordination case. Moreover, we also consider the
situation where the two sectors are asymmetric in terms of the (cost)
e¢ciency of providing health care.
There are some obvious informational asymmetries in the health care
market. A large part of the literature is therefore concerned with the
implications of such informational asymmetries for the amount of health
care and the quality of it.8 For example, several studies raise the issue of
professional freedom due to being self-employed.
6We do not explicitly model waiting time in the NHS system. However, in our
model excess demand implies that some patients are neither served by a private nor
a public provider. These patients can be considered as the waiting line, and the
corresponding deadweigth loss may be interpreted as the waiting costs in the NHS
system. There is, however, a reasonably large literature on waiting lists (see Cullis
et al., 2000, for an overview), where some papers consider the interaction with the
private sector, see e.g., Barros and Olivella (1999), Hoel and Sæther (2003), Iversen
(1997) and Olivella (2002).
7This may explain the restrictions imposed on NHS physicians’ private earings or
time spent in the private sector we observe in some countries (see Johnson, 1995).
8See Frech (1996) for a discussion of issues in the health market in general, and
Frech (1991) for a discussion of compensation schemes for physicians.
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how the reimbursement scheme a¤ects the provision of health care.9 In
this paper, though, we sidestep from some of the issues that have been
investigated in detail in the literature.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss various
modelling issues, such as the formulation of demand and supply and the
nature of the rivalry between the physicians. In Section 3 we derive the
physicians’ labour supply for given payments. In Section 4 we report
results concerning the equilibrium outcomes in two separate cases. In
the …rst one, the role of physicians’ job preferences is analysed, while in
the second case we consider asymmetric (cost) e¢ciencies in providing
care. Finally, in Section 5, we summarise our …ndings.
2 Model
Consider a health care system characterised by a National Health Service
(NHS). In this system there is a Health Authority (HA), hospital-based
physicians, and individuals in need for medical treatment (patients). The
HA is responsible for providing health care to patients. Public health
care is assumed to be free of charge, while patients seeking private health
care have to pay for the medical treatment as this is not included in the
NHS. The demand for private health care is represented by the following
inverse demand function:
p = 1¡Qo ¡Qp; (1)
where p is the marginal willingness to pay, Qo is the quantity of health
care provided by the public sector (o) and Qp is the quantity of health
care provided by the private sector (p). First, note from (1) that public
and private health care are assumed to be perfect substitutes from the
patients’ perspective.10 Second, note that we assume e¢cient rationing.
As the public sector provision of health care increases, the marginal
willingness to pay for private health care drops. Hence, the public sector
has by assumption served those consumers with the highest willingness
to pay for health care.11 Those not served by the public sector will have
9Ellis and McGuire (1986, 1990) have considered how the reimbursement scheme
a¤ects the supply of health services, while Ma (1994) and Sharma (1998) have in-
vestigated how it a¤ects quality as well as the incentives for reducing costs. For a
survey of the literature, see Newhouse (1996) or Ennis (1998).
1 0McAvinchey and Yannopoulos (1994) …nd in an empirical study that private and
public health care are substitutes. In some cases one could argue that private health
care is of higher quality than public health care, and in other cases vice versa. Since
we consider a situation where physicians operate in both the private and the public
sector, we …nd it reasonable to assume public and private health care as perfect
substitutes.
1 1This is consistent with a situation where the NHS is rationing patients according
to severity of illness, leaving the easier (milder) cases for the private sector. For a
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to seek private care to obtain treatment or wait for public treatment.
On the supply side, the important input to production is health per-
sonnel. Let us call them physicians. For ease of exposition, let us nor-
malise input and output so that one unit of labour equals one unit of
health care. Then Qi denotes the units of labour used in sector i, where
i = o; p. Since we focus on a speci…c health care product, it is plausible
to assume that there is only a limited number of physicians quali…ed to
supply the health care product in question in a speci…c area. In line with
this, we simplify by assuming that there are only two physicians in the
market, which may work in both the public and the private sector. Let
qki denote the labour supplied by physician k in sector i, where k = 1; 2:
Total provision of health care in sector i is then given by Qi =
P
k qki .
In the public sector, the physicians are on salary, earning the wage
w per unit of labour. In the private sector physicians are self-employed
and earns the pro…t from their private practice. Private sector revenues
are equal to the price p, and possibly a transfer r from the HA per unit
of health care (and thereby per unit of labour) provided. On the other
hand, spending time providing health care generates disutility for the
physicians. We …nd it plausible to assume a convex disutility function:
the longer a physician initially works, the greater disutility from a mar-
ginal labour increase.12 In line with this, we let the marginal disutility be
in‡uenced by a physician’s total amount of labour in public and private
sector.
However, it seems plausible as well to assume that a decision to work
more in one of the sectors is in‡uenced not only by total labour input,
but also by how much the physicians works in that particular sector
initially. The more she has worked in one sector, the higher marginal
disutility in this particular sector. This implies that physicians are not
indi¤erent about where to work, re‡ecting that they may have (intrinsic)
preferences for working in a public hospital or at a private clinic.13 A
similar approach, see e.g., Barros and Olivella (1999) and Olivella (2002).
1 2 In our setting we consider physicians that work in both the public and private
sector. The total amount of work can then be quite high, and each physician may
face some restrictions on their labour supply: There are obviously physical limitations
to how much each of them can work each day. Then it is natural to assume that
each physician’s total supply is approaching some kind of capacity constraint, and a
convex disutility function captures such a case.
1 3This may be due to non-pecuniary factors like job characteristics. For instance,
physicians may prefer to work in the public sector because of opportunities for re-
search and specialising, meeting colleagues, access to medical facilities, etc. On the
other hand, the private health care sector may be attractive because of, for instance,
more autonomy due to being self-employed. See e.g. Scott (2001) for the importance
of this.
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¢2 + ¡qkp¢2 + ±qko qkp; (2)
where 0 < ± < 2. The parameter ± measures the degree of substi-
tutability between working in the public and the private sector for each
physician.14 If ± ! 2, the marginal disutility is determined by only the
total amount of labour supplied. This corresponds to the case where
physician k perceives working in a public hospital or at a private clinic
as perfect substitutes. Contrary, if ± ! 0, the marginal disutility is de-
termined only by how much the physician works in either the private or
public sector initially, implying that the allocation of labour supply be-
tween the two sectors matters. This refers to the case where physicians
perceive public and private provision as imperfect substitutes.
We now have the following utility function for physician k:15
¼k = wqko + (p + r ¡ c) qkp ¡Gk; (3)
where c denotes the marginal cost of providing health care in the private
sector. The total marginal cost in private health care is the sum of c
and the marginal disutility. With a slight abuse of terminology, in the
following we refer to c as the marginal cost of private health care.
The HA is responsible for providing public health care. In line with
this, we …nd it reasonable to assume that the HA has a monopsony role
in the labour market for health care workers. In our model, we take this
into account by allowing it to set w, the wage in the public sector. In
addition, it can choose either to pay a per unit subsidy (r > 0) or impose
a per unit tax (r < 0) on private health care.
The HA is in principle concerned about consumer surplus, pro…ts as
well as any possible distortions in the economy generated by taxes. From
(1) we can derive the following utility function for persons demanding
this particular health care service:




1 4Alternatively, we can think of ± as the share of physicians that prefer to work in
the public or the private sector relative to those that are indi¤erent between where
to work.
1 5Note that we assume that physicians are not taking into account any patient
bene…t from health care when they maximize their utility. This non-altruistic ap-
proach is in contrast to some of the received literature, for example Rickman and
McGuire (1999), where the patient’s bene…t enters the physician’s utility function in
a direct way. In principle, though, it should be simple to encompass altruism in our
model. For example, it could be added as a downward shift in the disutility function.
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Public health care is by assumption o¤ered at a zero price to the patients.
The cost of public health care, as well as any possible transfers to the
private sector, are …nanced by distortionary taxes. Then we have the
following social welfare function:16
W = U ¡ pQp +
X
k
¼k ¡ (1 + ¸) (wQo+ rQp) ; (5)
where the parameter ¸ 2 (0; 1) represents the marginal cost of public
funds and captures the tax distortion. Rearranged, (5) can be written
as
W = U ¡ cQp ¡
X
k
Gk ¡ ¸ (wQo+ rQp)
Thus, the HA objective is to maximise patients’ (gross) bene…t of re-
ceiving medical treatment net of the physicians’ costs of providing this
health care as well as the social loss of …nancing health care associated
with distortionary taxation.
Each physician determines her own labour supply in each sector. It
is an open question whether physicians coordinate their decisions or not.
For example, could it be that physicians coordinate their decisions in the
private sector by establishing a joint private health care …rm where both
works? In theory, there are four possible situations. These are shown in
Table 1 below.
In the situation called competition in Table 1, both physicians set
their labour supply non-cooperatively. That would be the case where
physician k maximises the utility function speci…ed in (3), ¼k, with re-
spect to qko and qkp. However, we know from theory that the players can
jointly be better o¤ in a collusive outcome. In such a case, the physi-
cians would maximise joint utility, ¼1+¼2, with respect to the physicians’
labour supply in both sectors: q1o ; q2o ; q1p and q2p. In this situation, denoted
perfect coordination in Table 1, both physicians are expected to restrict
their total supply of labour, thereby increasing the equilibrium price in
the private sector. If each physician’s discount factor is su¢ciently high,
we know that perfect coordination can be the equilibrium outcome in a
repeated game.
1 6One could specify other ob jectives for the HA. We have checked whether exclud-
ing the physicians’ utility in the welfare function, implying that the HA is concerned
about patients’ welfare and costly transfers only, matters for the analysis. However,
it turns out that this does not change the results qualitatively. Details are available
from the authors upon request.
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Sector No Private Competition
coordination
In the two remaining situations, public coordination and private co-
ordination, the physicians coordinate their labour supply in only one
sector. However, we …nd neither of those two situations plausible. If
the physicians have coordinated their labour supply in one sector, why
should they not extend the cooperation to also include the other sector
and thereby be better o¤? Therefore, we …nd it reasonable to contrast
competition with perfect coordination. From now on we denote the lat-
ter simply coordination. We let superscript M and D denote coordina-
tion and competition, respectively. Whether coordination would be the
equilibrium outcome is determined by exogenous factors such as period
length and time preference rate. In addition, we may expect the struc-
ture of the private sector to be of importance. In particular, whether
antitrust enforcement allows physicians to establish joint facilities can
be decisive for whether a competitive outcome is attained or not in the
labour market.
The rules of the game are the following:
² Stage 1: The Health Authority sets w and r.
² Stage 2: The physicians set qki , where i = o; p and k = 1; 2.
The model is, as usual, solved by backward induction.
3 Physicians’ labour supply
Let us start by analysing the physicians’ behaviour at stage 2 of the
game. In particular, we are interested in how job preferences and the
cost of private provision of health care a¤ects the physicians’ labour
supply for a given wage and subsidy (or tax). This also enables us
to see how a marginal change in the HA’s policy instruments w and r
a¤ects the physicians’ provision of public and private health care. In the
competition game, physician k sets qko and qkp to maximise (3), yielding
the following …rst order conditions with respect to qko and qkp:17
w ¡ qkp = 2qko + ±qkp; (6)
1 7Second order conditions require that ± < ¡1 + 2p2 ' 1:83.
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1 + r ¡ ¡qko + q lo¢ ¡ 2qkp ¡ qlp = c+ 2qkp + ±qko ; (7)
respectively, where k; l = 1; 2 and k 6= l. The left-hand side of (6) and (7)
represent the marginal revenues of providing public and private health
care, respectively, while the right-hand sides are the corresponding mar-
ginal costs. Notice the crowding-out e¤ect each physician is facing when
deciding her labour supply in the public and the private sector. When
increasing the time spent at a public hospital, more patients are taken
care of in the public sector, and this will, in turn, lower the demand for
private health care. Thus, by restricting the labour supply in the public
sector, the physician increases the pro…tability of working in the private
sector.
Solving stage 2 of the game, yields the following equilibrium out-
comes:
QDo (w; r) = 2
5w ¡ (1 + r ¡ c) (1 + ±)
8¡ 3± ¡ ±2 (8)
QDp (w; r) = 2
2 (1 + r ¡ c) ¡w (2 + ±)
8¡ 3± ¡ ±2 ; (9)
where the superscriptD denotes that we consider the competition game.
In the coordination game, the physicians set q1o; q2o ; q1p and q2p to max-
imise joint pro…t, ¼1+ ¼2; yielding the following …rst order conditions
with respect to qko and qkp:18
w ¡ ¡qkp + qlp¢ = 2qko + ±qkp ; (10)
1 + r ¡ c¡ ¡qko + qlo¢ ¡ 2¡qkp + q lp¢ = 2qkp + ±qko ; (11)
respectively. Again the left-hand side of (10) and (11) are the marginal
revenues of providing public and private health care, respectively, and
the right-hand sides are the corresponding marginal costs. While coor-
dination eliminates the negative externality between physicians due to
non-cooperatively labour supply present in the competition game, we
see from the conditions that the crowding-out e¤ect between public and
private labour supply is also present in this case. Solving the …rst order
conditions, yields the following outcomes at stage 2 of the game:
QMo (w; r) = 2
6w ¡ (1 + r ¡ c) (2 + ±)
8¡ 4± ¡ ±2 (12)
QMp (w; r) = 2
2 (1 + r ¡ c) ¡ w (2 + ±)
8¡ 4± ¡ ±2 ; (13)
where the superscript M denotes that we consider the coordination
game.
1 8Second order conditions require ± < ¡2 + 2p3 ' 1:46:
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As expected, physicians will work more in the public sector and less
in the private sector when the wage (w) becomes higher, all else equal.
The opposite is true when the HA subsidises private health care provision
(r > 0). We also see that the marginal cost of private provision (c)
a¤ects the physicians’ allocation of working time. A high c induces the
physicians to spend less time in the private sector and more time in the
public sector. The reason is that since physicians are self-employed in
the private sector, they fully take into account the marginal cost in the
private sector as this lowers the pro…t margin and therefore their private
earnings. Notably, any potential production costs of public provision
would not been taken into account by the physicians as these are covered
by the HA and do not a¤ect the physicians’ wage income. These e¤ects
are present irrespective of whether physicians compete or coordinate
their labour supply, though the magnitude can be di¤erent.
The e¤ect of physician preferences, measured by ±, on private versus
public labour supply (for given w and r) is, however, more complicated.
Examination of the equilibrium outcomes enables the following state-
ment.
Proposition 1 For given payments w and r, then
(i) Qjo > 0 if w > wj and Qjp > 0 if w < wj, where j =D;M:
(ii) Qjo > 0 and Qjp > 0 if wj < w < wj, where j = D;M:
(iii) @@±
¡
wj ¡ wj¢ < 0 and @@c ¡wj ¡ wj¢ < 0, where j =D;M:
A Proof is provided in Appendix B.
When physicians have the ability to decide their labour supply in
the public and the private sector, and this a¤ects the number of patients
treated in either sector, the amount of public and private health care
depends crucially on the public sector wage relative to potential pro…ts
in the private sector. From the Proposition it is clear that there is an
upper and a lower bound on the wage that induces the physicians to
work in both sectors.19 If the wage becomes su¢ciently low, physicians
decide to spend time only in the private sector, while if the wage becomes
su¢ciently high they decide to only work in the public sector.
Less evident, though, is the e¤ect of physicians’ job preferences (mea-
sured by ±) on private versus public provision of health care. From part
(ii) in the Proposition we see that as physicians become more indi¤erent
about where to work, i.e. ± increases, the scope for a mixed health care
system is reduced. The reason is that ± a¤ects the physicians’ division
of labour between the two sectors. When ± is low job characteristics
1 9Alternatively, we could de…ne this in terms of the support to, or taxation on,
private health care supply (r).
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matter relatively more than earnings in the two sectors for the physi-
cians decision of how much time to spend in each sector. As the job
characteristics di¤er in the public and private sector, physicians …nd it
optimal to spend some time in both sectors in this case. On the other
hand, when ± is high relative earnings in the two sectors are decisive for
the physicians’ labour supply, implying that they now tend to spend all
their time in the sector that yield higher payments. This e¤ect explains
why the scope for a mixed system tends to be lower when ± is high than
for a low ±.
A similar pattern is observed with respect to the private sector cost
(c), but intuition is di¤erent. An increase in c, makes is less pro…table
to work in the private sector, inducing a shift in labour supply towards
the public sector, all else equal. Consequently, the scope for a mixed
system is decreasing in the marginal cost of private provision.
4 The Health Authority
Let us now turn to stage one of the game. At this stage the HA sets the
public sector wage and the private sector subsidy (or tax). As pointed
out in the previous section, both job preferences and the cost of pri-
vate provision in‡uence the physicians’ allocation of labour between the
public and the private sector. In the two next sections, we therefore
examine in detail how these two factors a¤ect the HA’s wage and sub-
sidy setting, and how this in turn determines the amount of public and
private health care. We will also focus on how the nature of competition
between physicians plays a role in this regard.
4.1 Physicians’ job preferences
Let us start by examining the role of physicians’ job preferences. For
the moment, we assume that public and private provision are equally
e¢cient, i.e. c = 0. At stage one of the game, the HA sets w and r
to maximise (5), anticipating the physicians’ labour supply responses.
In the competition case, these are given by (8) and (9), and in the
coordination case they are given by (12) and (13). The equilibrium
outcomes in the competition and coordination game are presented in
Table A in Appendix A.
Considering the scope for public and private health care, the following
result can be established.
Proposition 2 Assume that c = 0. Then
(i) Qjo > 0 if ± < ±
j, and Qjp > 0, where j =D;M:
(ii) ±M > ±D and @±
j
@¸ < 0, where j = D;M:
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Figure 1: The scope for public and private health care depending on
job preferences (±) and tax distortions (¸) when physicians compete (F )
and coordinate (S).
A Proof is provided in Appendix B.
From the proposition it is clear that the stability of a NHS with a
private sector alongside depends on physicians’ job preferences and the
cost of tax distortions. Figure 1 illustrates the two possible candidates
for equilibrium of the game, where the thick lines represent the compe-
tition case (D) and the thin lines refer to the coordination case (M ).
We see that a mixed health care system is stable only if public and pri-
vate sector work is perceived as su¢ciently di¤erentiated (i.e., a low ±)
and the marginal cost of public funds (¸) is su¢ciently low. This is
the case whether physicians compete or coordinate their labour supply.
However, if both ± and ¸ becomes su¢ciently high then the equilibrium
is characterised by a pure private health care system.
To understand the result, note that a reduction in labour supply
in the public sector has distinctly di¤erent e¤ect on physicians’ utility
than a reduction in the private sector labour supply. By lowering the
time spent at a public hospital, some patients are not served in the
public sector but have to seek private health care to receive medical
treatment. This increases the demand for private health care and the
pro…t potential in the private sector, which in turn the same physicians
bene…t from since they work in both sectors. As explained above, this
e¤ect is stronger the more indi¤erent physicians are between working in
the public and the private sector. When in addition the public provision
is rather costly due to a high marginal cost of public funds, the HA faces
a weaker incentive to mitigate physicians’ shift toward private provision,
potentially inducing the private sector to crowd out the public sector.
The result in Proposition 2 points to a fundamental problem within
13
NHS systems allowing for private sector provision alongside the public
provision. When physicians have the opportunity to o¤er their services
to the same patients in the private sector, the provision of free public
health care can be seriously constrained. This is especially the case
when relative earnings rather than job characteristics are decisive for
the physicians labour supply and, in addition, costs of public funds is
high due to tax distortions. Notably, this result emerges even though
the HA has the opportunity to restrict private health care by means of
public sector wage and private sector taxation. To fully understand the
mechanisms at work let us therefore brie‡y consider the HA’s optimal
policy.
Proposition 3 Assume c = 0. Then
(i) rj > 0 if ¸ < ¸j, where j =D;M.
(ii) @rj@¸ < 0 and
@wj
@¸ < 0, where j = D;M .
(iii) @rj@± < 0 if ± < b±jr , and @wj@± > 0, where j =D;M.
A Proof is provided in Appendix B.
From the Proposition we see that the HA subsidises the private sector
when the cost of tax distortion is su¢ciently small, while it imposes a
tax on private health care when this cost becomes su¢ciently large.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. The rationale for subsidising private
health care is related to the fact that public health care provision is fully
…nanced through distortionary taxation. By allowing the private sector
to take care of some patients, the HA is able to lower public spendings on
health care and in turn the e¢ciency loss associated with tax distortion.
However, if the marginal cost of public funds becomes su¢ciently high,
the HA …nds it bene…cial to instead impose a tax on private health
care provision. This is partly because supporting private health care
provision in itself becomes more costly, but also partly because a high ¸
lowers the wage and thus the public provision of health care, which is in
line with part (ii) of the Proposition.
Perhaps more interestingly, we see from part (iii) of the Proposition
that the HA responds to an increase in ± by raising the public sector
wage and lowering the subsidy (or increasing the tax) on private pro-
vision. When ± is high relative earnings rather than job characteristics
are decisive for physicians labour supply. In this case, the incentive for
physicians to reshu-e patients from the public sector to the private sec-
tor is stronger. To mitigate this e¤ect the HA therefore imposes a higher
tax and o¤ers a higher wage as a response to an increase in ±.
The exception to this rule is when ± is su¢ciently high. Then the HA
responds to an increase in ± by increasing the subsidy to (or lowering
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the tax on) private provision. As the HA still responds to a higher ±
by increasing the public sector wage, this policy may seem inconsistent.
However, the rationale for this policy is that total amount of health care
provided becomes lower as ± increases. As it becomes more costly for
the physicians to provide health care, the HA needs to stimulate the
physicians’ incentive to work more in both sectors.
Turning to the question of what role competition in the physicians
market play, we have the following result.
Proposition 4 Assume c = 0 and ± < ±
M
. Then
(i) wM > wD and rM > rD.
(ii) QDo < QMo if ± < e±o, and QDp > QMp .
(iii) QDo + QDp > QMo + QMp .
A Proof is provided in Appendix B.
Thus, in the coordination regime physicians face a higher public sec-
tor wage and a higher (lower) subsidy (tax) on private health care provi-
sion. The argument is that the HA …nds private provision less desirable
when physicians coordinate their labour supply as this leads to higher
prices. In addition, the total amount of health care provided is less when
physicians coordinate their activities than when they compete. This is
because physicians …nd it pro…table to restrict their labour supply in
both sectors. Thus, in order to mitigate this negative e¤ects of coordi-
nation, the HA sets a higher wage and a higher subsidy (or lower tax)
in the coordination regime than in the competition regime.
From part (ii) of the Proposition we see that the scope for public
health care is lower when physicians compete rather than coordinate,
while the opposite is true for private health care. The reason is as follows.
As explained above, the HA stimulates the physician to provide more
health care under coordination by setting a higher wage and subsidy
than under competition. The physicians respond by increasing their
labour supply in both sectors, but more so in the public sector than in
the private sector in order to keep high prices and pro…ts.
However, if ± becomes su¢ciently high, this pattern is changed. In
this case, physicians spend more time in both sectors when they compete
despite the fact that they receive a lower wage and a lower subsidy than
under coordination. The reason is that under coordination, physicians
take into account the e¤ect of ± on total costs, while under competition
only its own costs matter for a physician’s labour supply.
Finally, we see that the total provision of health care is higher when
physicians compete than when they coordinate their labour supply ir-
respective of the physicians’ job preferences. This happens despite the
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fact that the HA attempts to induce more health care provision in the
coordination regime.
4.2 Asymmetric cost e¢ciency
The results above were derived under the assumption that the public and
the private sector were equally (cost) e¢cient in producing health care.
In practice, this may not always be the case. In health care systems
characterised as NHS, public hospitals may have access to inputs, like
medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, etc., at lower prices than private
clinics, for instance, because they are larger buyers. In this section we
therefore assume a positive marginal cost in the private sector (c > 0).
To focus on the e¤ect of asymmetric cost e¢ciency, we abstract from
the issue of physicians’ job preferences by setting ± = 1.
At stage one of the game, the HA sets w and r to maximise (5),
anticipating the physicians’ labour supply responses. In the competition
case, these are given by (8) and (9), and in the coordination case they are
given by (12) and (13). The equilibrium outcomes in the competition and
coordination game are presented in Table B in Appendix A. Examining
the scope for public and private health care, the following result can be
established.
Proposition 5 Assume that ± = 1: Then
(i) Qjo > 0 and Qjp > 0 if cj < c < cj, where j =D;M.
(ii) cD > cM, and cD > cM:
(iii) @cj@¸ > 0, and
@cj
@¸ > 0, where j = D;M .
A Proof is provided in Appendix B.
According to the proposition there is no interior solution if marginal
costs in the private sector are either too high or too low. When c is
su¢ciently low we may have an equilibrium with private health care
provision only, while the opposite occurs when c becomes su¢ciently
high. The reason is intuitive. Consider the case of a low c. On one
hand, a low c makes private provision relatively more desirable since
it is more e¢cient and yields lower prices, which both tend to increase
the scope for private provision. On the other hand, a low c induces the
physicians to work more in the private sector because they earn higher
pro…ts relative to the case of a high c. Thus, when c is low the HA must
o¤er a high wage (or impose a substantial tax) to mitigate physicians’
incentives to reallocate their labour supply towards the private sector.
Moreover, we see from (iii) that an increase in the marginal cost of
public funds (¸) will reduce the scope for the public sector. The reason
is obvious. By allowing the private sector to provide relatively more
16
Figure 2: The scope for public and private health care depending on pri-
vate sector costs (c) and tax distortions (¸) when physicians coordinate
(S) or compete (F ).
health care, and not subsidising private health care (see below), the HA
can avoid serious distortions caused by taxation.
In Figure 2, we have shown the upper and lower bounds on c de-
pending on the marginal cost of public fund in both the competition
(D) and the coordination (M ) case. From the …gure (and result (ii)
in the Proposition) we see that the critical values of c are higher when
physicians compete rather than coordinate their labour supply. Thus,
the scope for public provision is lower in the competition case. To un-
derstand this, note the trade-o¤ the HA is facing. On one hand, free
health care by the public sector typically leads to a smaller price distor-
tion than what is the case with private health care. This is the case if
the price-cost margin in the private sector is larger than the (negative)
price-cost margin in the public sector. If so, public health care leads to
a lower deadweight loss.
On the other hand, free public health care incur costs associated with
distortionary taxation, a cost that is not present in a private sector. The
higher the wage paid to physicians, and thereby the larger capacity in
the public sector, the higher is the cost associated with distortionary
taxation. If physicians compete, labour supply in the private sector will
increase and the deadweight loss will be reduced. Thus, it is no surprise
then that competition between physicians results in a greater scope for
the private sector to provide health care. This result suggests that an
increase in the number of physicians would lead to a greater scope for the
private provision of health care. The intuition is that a larger number of
physicians would result in a lower price-cost margin in the private sector,
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and therefore less concern for deadweight loss in the private sector.
Proposition 6 Assume that ± = 1 and cj < c < cj, where j = D;M .
Then
(i) rj > 0 if c < bcj, and @bcj@¸ < 0.
(ii) @rM@c < 0 if ¸ <
p
241¡7




(iii) @wj@c < 0.
A Proof is provided in Appendix B.
From the proposition we see that the HA subsidises (taxes) private
health care if the marginal cost of private provision (c) is su¢ciently low
(high). The reason is that the HA is concerned about the total surplus
in society, and encourages private health care only if it is su¢ciently
cost e¢cient relative to public provision. Since public support is raised
through distortionary taxation, the decision of whether to subsidise (or
tax) the private sector depends also on the size of the loss due to tax
collection. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where the dashed lines repre-
sent the set of parameter values for which r = 0 in the competition case
(thin line) and the coordination case (thick line), respectively.
Intuitively, we would expect that the HA responds to a cost reduction
in the private sector by lowering the wage and increasing the support to
private health care provision in order to reshu-e production from the
public to the private sector. However, the picture is more complicated.
All else equal, each physician responds to lower costs in the private sector
by spending less time in the public sector and more time in the private
sector. The HA must take this into account, and this may lead to some
counter-intuitive results.
As we would expect a priori, the HA increases the support to private
health care provision as a response to a cost reduction in the private sec-
tor. By doing so it re-enforces the physicians’ incentive to work more in
the private sector and in turn increases private health care production,
which has become less costly. The exception to this rule is when tax
distortions are su¢ciently large. In this case the HA is concerned about
the increase in private health care provision following a cost reduction,
because this results in more costly public transfers. Therefore, it re-
sponds to a lower private sector cost by reducing its support to private
health care if tax distortions are su¢ciently high.
However, irrespective of the costs of taxation the HA increases the
public sector wage following a cost reduction in the private sector. This
is a response to the physicians’ shift in labour supply towards the private
sector when c becomes lower. By increasing the wage the HA mitigates
the reduction in the public provision of health care. Then we have
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that in some cases the HA responds to a cost reduction in the private
sector by increasing its support to both the private and the public sector.
The intuition is that there is no one-to-one relationship between labour
supply in the private and the public sector - a certain increase in labour
supply in one sector would not lead to an identical reduction in labour
supply in the other sector. The HA has one instrument tailored to
the private sector (r) and one tailored to the public sector (w). It can
therefore monitor the changes better by using both instruments than by
using one of them, and in some cases it has to counterbalance the forces
at work.
As these e¤ects are present irrespective of whether physicians com-
pete or coordinate their labour supply, let us now turn to the comparison
of the two di¤erent regimes.
Proposition 7 Assume that ± = 1 and cD < c < cM . Then
(i) wM > wD if c < ecw, and rM > rD if c < ecr:
(ii) QMo > QDo and QMp < QDp .
(iii) QMo + QMp < QDo + QDp .
A Proof is provided in Appendix B.
We see from part (i) of the proposition that coordination between
physicians involves a higher wage and a higher subsidy (or lower tax)
than competition, given that the marginal cost of private provision is
su¢ciently low. The reason is that coordination enables the physicians
to achieve higher pro…ts in the private sector by restricting their labour
supply in both the public and private sector. Thus, the HA has to set a
high wage and subsidy to encourage the physicians to work more in both
sectors, and by this increase the amount of public and private health care
supplied in the coordination case.
However, for su¢ciently high costs in the private sector this result
may be reversed, and both wages and support to the private sector may
be lower in the coordination regime than in the competitive regime. High
costs of private provision will make it unattractive to encourage private
provision. Since private provision is higher in the competition case than
in the coordination case - all else equal - then support to the private
provision is lower in the competition case than in the coordination case
if c is su¢ciently high. This has, in turn, implications for the wages
setting. The HA can set a lower wage in the competition case than in
the coordination case and still attract labour to the public sector, since
now support for private provision is low in the competition case.
From part (ii) of the Proposition, we see that the scope for private
health care provision is higher when physicians compete rather than co-
ordinate their labour supply, while the scope for public health care is
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lower in this case. The reason for this is as follows. In the competition
regime, physicians compete for market shares in the private sector, in-
ducing each of them to provide a substantial amount of private health
care. However, this has an indirect negative e¤ect on their labour sup-
ply in the public sector. Thus, in the competition regime each physician
supplies more labour in the private sector than is the case under coordi-
nation, and compensates for this by supplying less labour in the public
sector.
Finally, we see from part (iii) that a competitive labour market re-
sults in a larger total production of health care than is the case when
the physicians’ labour supply is coordinated. This implies that in our
model the increase in production in the private sector due to a shift from
coordination to competition is not o¤set by the indirect, negative e¤ect
on public health care provision.
5 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this article has been to investigate the interaction be-
tween public and private health care in a NHS. We have emphasised
the close links between the public and the private sector on both the
demand and supply side, and focused on how endogenous labour sup-
ply, cost e¢ciency in the two sectors, and the nature of competition
between physicians may a¤ect a HA’s public policy. The paper provides
the following three main …ndings.
First, we have pointed to a fundamental problem that may arise
when physicians are allowed to earn revenues from private health care
in addition to wage income from public health care. Physicians can
increase the demand for private health care by restricting their supply
of labour in the public health sector. The outcome in terms of health
care system depends crucially on the physicians’ job preferences. When
physicians are close to being indi¤erent between work in the public and
private sectors, the scope for a mixed health care system tends to be
very limited.
Second, the endogenous nature of labour supply complicates public
policy. In some cases results are in line with what we expect. For exam-
ple, the HA supports the private sector if the cost of private health care
is su¢ciently low. In other cases, though, it is not that straightforward.
For example, consider the case of a more e¢cient private sector. This
triggers a shift of labour supply from public to private health care. Then
it is not obvious whether the government should respond by increasing
or reducing the wage in the public sector. The latter may apparently be
the right choice. But we …nd in our setting that in some cases it should
respond to a cost reduction in the private sector by increasing the public
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wage, thereby dampening the shift of labour supply from the public to
the private sector.
Third, we show that the nature of the rivalry between the physicians
may be important for public policy. In our setting, physicians can either
coordinate their labour supply or compete on labour supply. We …nd
that competition between physicians results in an increase in private
health care production and a reduction in public health care production.
Then it is not obvious how competition a¤ects the total production. In
our model the …rst e¤ect (increase in private health care) dominates,
so that competition between physicians leads to an increase in total
production of health care.
Before the paper is concluded, we would like to stress that our model
is stylised and that many of the results are ambiguous. For example,
(i) the public health care sector can either be driven out of the market
or not, and (ii) private health care can be either taxed or subsidized.
Ambiguity in a stylised model implies that we will also have to report
ambiguous results in a generalised version of our model. This fact sug-
gests that the model should not be used to predict some clear-cut policy
recommendations, but rather to point out some mechanisms that may
be of importance in mixed health care systems.
6 Appendix A: Equilibrium Outcomes
Table A: Equilibrium outcomes when ± > 0 and c = 0:
Competition (D) Coordination (M )
























Table B: Equilibrium outcomes when ± = 1 and c > 0.
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7 Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the competition game (j = D).
Setting (8) and (9) equal to zero and solving for w, yield the following








(1 + r ¡ c) :
Comparing these critical values, it is easily veri…ed that
wD ¡ wD = (8 ¡ 3± ¡ ±
2)
5 (2 + ±)
(1 + r ¡ c) > 0:
Furthermore, we can prove that Qko (w; r) = 0 for any w < wD and
Qkp (w; r) = 0 for any w > wD . Hence part (i) and (ii) of the Proposition





wD ¡ wD¢ = ¡14 + 4± + ±2
5 (2 + ±)2




wD ¡wD¢ = ¡(8¡ 3± ¡ ±2)
5 (2 + ±)
< 0
22
In a similar way the results for the coordination game (j = M) can
be proved. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2: Setting QDo and QMo , reported in Table
A in Appendix A, equal to zero and solve with respect to ±, we get the
following critical values
±D =
(2 ¡ ¸) (1 + 3¸)
(1 + ¸) (1 + 2¸)
;
±M = 21 + 3¸ ¡ 2¸
2
1 + 3¸+ 2¸2
:
These critical values are plotted in Figure 1. Comparing the critical
values, we have that
±M ¡ ±D = ¸ (1¡ ¸)
(1 + ¸) (1 + 2¸)
> 0:




2 + 14¸+ 1




= ¡8¸ 2 + 3¸
(1 + 3¸ +2¸2)2
< 0:
Finally, it can be shown that QDp and QMp are strictly positive for any
relevant values of ± and ¸. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3: Setting rD and rM , reported in Table A




9¡ 3± ¡ ±2 ¡ p217 ¡ 162± ¡ 5±2 + 14±3 + ±4




(2¡ ±) (200 ¡ 76± ¡ 26±2 ¡ ±3)¡ (2 ¡ ±) (6 + ±)
4 (8¡ 4± ¡ ±2) :
These critical values are plotted in Figure 1. Then we can show that
rj > 0 for any ¸ < b¸jr and rj < 0 for any ¸ > b¸jr, which proves part (i)
of the Proposition.
Part (ii) and (iii) are established by checking the partial derivatives
of wj and rj with respect to ¸ and ±. It can be shown that @wj@¸ < 0,
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@rj
@¸ < 0 and
@wj
@± < 0 for any relevant values of ¸ and ±. However, in the





Solving this for ±, we get the following critical value
b±Dr = 2 +7¸ + 9¸2 ¡ 3¸3 ¡ 2p¸ (1 + 6¸ + 2¸2) (2 + 2¸¡ 2¸2 ¡ 5¸3)(1 + ¸ + ¸2) (1 + 2¸) :
It can be shown that b±Dr < ±D for some values of ¸ 2 (0; 1). Then
by numerical computation we …nd that @rD@± < 0 for any ± < b±Dr , and
@rD
@± > 0 for any ± > b±Dr . In a similar way, we can prove this to hold for
the coordination case (D) as well. QED.
Proof of Proposition 4: Setting QDo = QMo and solve with respect
to, for instance, ±, we get the following critical value
e±o = 4+ 13¸ + ¸2 ¡ p64 + 240¸ + 145¸2 ¡ 334¸3 ¡ 111¸42 (3 + ¸) (1 + 2¸) :
It can be shown that e±o 2 ³0; ±M´ for ¸ 2 (0:64; 1). Then by numerical
computation we …nd that QDo > QMo if ± < e±o and QDo < QMo if ± > e±o:
In a similar way, the rest of the Proposition can be proven. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) cM (or cM) is found by setting the
equilibrium value of qMp (or qMo ) in the coordination regime (see Table
B) equal to zero and solve with respect to c, yielding the following critical
values
cM ´ 2 ¸
2¸ + 3
and cM ´ 1
3
¡2 + 3¸2
1 + 2¸ + ¸2
In a similar way, we …nd
cD ´ 12
4¸+ 1
2¸+ 3 and c
D ´ 15
5¸2 ¡ 3
¸2 +2¸ +1 ;
in the competition game.
(ii) It is easy to check that cj > cj, where j = D;M . From these
expressions, we have that
cD ¡ cM = 1
2(2¸ +3)
> 0 and cD ¡ cM = 1
15 (1 + 2¸+ ¸2)
> 0
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(¸+ 1) (1 + 2¸+ ¸2)
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 6: Setting rM and rD (reported in Table B in
Appendix A) equal to zero, respectively, and then solve the expressions
with respect to c, we …nd
bcM = 2 ¡ 7¸ ¡ 6¸2
8 ¡ 7¸ ¡ 6¸2 and bcD = ¡1 ¡ 2¸ + 5¸23 + 8¸ +5¸2 ;
which yields result (i).
From the equilibrium values reported in Table B in Appendix A, we





¡8 + 7¸+ 6¸2






(5 + 7¸) (1 + 3¸)
:
and on the wage:
@wM
@c
= ¡ 6 (1 + ¸)




= ¡ 2 (1 ¡ ¸
2)
(5 + 7¸) (1 + 3¸)
;
Then we can easily verify the results reported in the Proposition. QED.
Proof of Proposition 7: Result (i) is found by setting wM = wD,
reported in Table B in Appendix A, and then solve for c, yielding
ecw = 7+ 32¸ + 73¸2 + 116¸3 + 24¸42 (14 + 71¸ ¡ 118¸2 + 73¸3+ 12¸4) :
It can be shown that @(w
M¡wD)
@c < 0, which implies that w
M > wD
for any c < ecw. Furthermore, it can be shown that ecw < cM . Hence,
wM > wD for all relevant values of c. In a similar way, we can prove the
rest of result (i).
Result (ii) is found by setting QMo = QDo and solve with respect to c,
yielding eco = 7 +32¸+ 73¸2 +116¸3 +24¸42 (14 + 71¸¡ 118¸2 +73¸3 + 12¸4):
Then it can be shown that QMo > QDo for any c > eco . Furthermore, it
can be shown that eco < cM . Hence, QMo > QDo for all relevant values of
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